Relativism and the expressivist bifurcation

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):357-378 (2018)


Traditional expressivists want to preserve a contrast between the representational use of declarative sentences in descriptive domains and the non-representational use of declarative sentences in other areas of discourse. However, expressivists have good reasons to endorse minimalism about representational notions, and minimalism seems to threaten the existence of such a bifurcation. Thus, there are pressures for expressivists to become global anti-representationalists. In this paper I discuss how to reconstruct in non-representationalist terms the sort of bifurcation traditional expressivists were after. My proposal is that the relevant bifurcation can be articulated by appeal to the contrast between relativistic and non-relativistic assertoric practices. I argue that this contrast, which can be specified without appeal to representational notions, captures the core intuitions behind the expressivist bifurcation.

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References found in this work

Scorekeeping in a Language Game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.
Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Context.Robert Stalnaker - 2014 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work

Global expressivism as global subjectivism.Lionel Shapiro - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (3):777-799.
The Primacy of Practice.José L. Zalabardo - 2019 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 86:181-199.

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