Schroeder and Whiting on Knowledge and Defeat

Logos and Episteme 7 (2):231-238 (2016)

Abstract

Daniel Whiting has argued, in this journal, that Mark Schroeder’s analysis of knowledge in terms of subjectively and objectively sufficient reasons for belief makes wrong predictions in fake barn cases. Schroeder has replied that this problem may be avoided if one adopts a suitable account of perceptual reasons. I argue that Schroeder’s reply fails to deal with the general worry underlying Whiting’s purported counterexample, because one can construct analogous potential counterexamples that do not involve perceptual reasons at all. Nevertheless, I claim that it is possible to overcome Whiting’s objection, by showing that it rests on an inadequate characterization of how defeat works in the examples in question.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-01-08

Downloads
242 (#47,558)

6 months
26 (#34,340)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

References found in this work

The Ethics of Belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.
Respecting the Evidence.Richard Feldman - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):95–119.
Internalism Defended.Earl Conee & Richard Feldman - 2001 - In Hilary Kornblith (ed.), American Philosophical Quarterly. Blackwell. pp. 1 - 18.
Internalism Defended.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 2001 - American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1):1 - 18.
The Ethics of Belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.

View all 15 references / Add more references

Similar books and articles

Schroeder on the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem for Attitudes.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2013 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (3):1-8.
Why I’M Still a Proportionalist.Travis Rieder - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):251-270.
Having Reasons and the Factoring Account.Errol Lord - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):283 - 296.
Reasons and Guidance.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (3):214-235.
How Reasons Bear on Intentions.Graham Hubbs - 2013 - Ethics 124 (1):84-100.
Review of Mark Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions[REVIEW]David Sobel - 2009 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (4).
Reasons, Answers, and Goals.John Turri - 2012 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (4):491-499.
Humean Agent-Neutral Reasons?Daan Evers - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (1):55 – 67.