A defense of creationism in fiction

Grazer Philosophische Studien 67 (1):131-155 (2004)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Creationism is the conjunction of the following theses: (i) fictional individuals (e.g. Sherlock Holmes) actually exist; (ii) fictional names (e.g., 'Holmes') are at least sometimes genuinely referential; (iii) fictional individuals are the creations of the authors who first wrote (or spoke, etc.) about them. CA Creationism is the conjunction of (i) - (iii) and the following thesis: (iv) fictional individuals are contingently existing abstracta; they are non-concrete artifacts of our world and various other possible worlds. TakashiYagisawa has recently provided a number of arguments designed to show that Creationism is unjustified. I here critically examine three of his challenges to CA Creationism. I argue that each fails to undermine this version of Creationism.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
391 (#29,410)

6 months
60 (#21,618)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jeffrey Goodman
James Madison University

Citations of this work

Pretense, existence, and fictional objects.Anthony Everett - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):56–80.
Fictional Entities.Fiora Salis - 2013 - Online Companion to Problems in Analytic Philosophy.
What is Bitcoin?Craig Warmke - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Fiction and indeterminate identity.David Friedell - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):221-229.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1985 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
Nonexistent Objects.Terence Parsons - 1980 - Yale University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.

View all 17 references / Add more references