A suspicious feature of the popper/miller argument

Philosophy of Science 57 (3):535-536 (1990)
The form of argument used by Popper and Miller to attack the concept of probabilistic induction is applied to the slightly different situation in which some evidence undermines a hypothesis. The result is seemingly absurd, thus bringing the form of argument under suspicion.
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DOI 10.1086/289573
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