A St Petersburg Paradox for risky welfare aggregation

Analysis 81 (3):420-426 (2021)
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Abstract

The principle of Anteriority says that prospects that are identical from the perspective of every possible person’s welfare are equally good overall. The principle enjoys prima facie plausibility, and has been employed for various theoretical purposes. Here it is shown using an analogue of the St Petersburg Paradox that Anteriority is inconsistent with central principles of axiology.

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10.1093/analys/anaa079

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Zachary Goodsell
National University of Singapore

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Philosophy of logic.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1986 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Edited by Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons.
Why We Should Reject S.Derek Parfit - 1984 - In Reasons and Persons. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The logic of paradox.Graham Priest - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):219 - 241.
Equality and priority.Derek Parfit - 1997 - Ratio 10 (3):202–221.

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