Journal of Applied Philosophy 31 (2):363-376 (2014)

Authors
Robert Goodin
Australian National University
Christian Barry
Australian National University
Abstract
Bracket out the wrong of committing a wrong, or conspiring or colluding or conniving with others in their committing one. Suppose you have done none of those things, and you find yourself merely benefiting from a wrong committed wholly by someone else. What, if anything, is wrong with that? What, if any, duties follow from it? If straightforward restitution were possible — if you could just ‘give back’ what you received as a result of the wrongdoing to its rightful owner — then matters are morally more straightforward. But in real-world cases that is often impossible, and questions of ‘how much, from whom and to whom?’ become far more vexing. The beneficiary disgorging all benefits of the wrong is part of the story, but where that is not possible or will not suffice to compensate the victim of wrongdoing we discuss various ways of allocating the cost of making the victim whole, including supplementation from public coffers
Keywords Benefiting from Injustice  Duties  Distributing responsibility
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/japp.12077
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Upload history
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Animal Rights and the Duty to Harm: When to Be a Harm Causing Deontologist.C. E. Abbate - 2020 - Zeitschrift Für Ethik Und Moralphilosophie 3 (1):5-26.
Should the Beneficiaries Pay?Robert Huseby - 2015 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 14 (2):1470594-13506366.
The Moral Taintedness of Benefiting From Injustice.Tom Parr - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (4):985-997.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Benefiting From Injustice and Brute Luck.Carl Knight - 2013 - Social Theory and Practice 39 (4):581-598.
Can There Be Full Excuses for Morally Wrong Actions?Eduardo Rivera-López - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):124-142.
Being Wrong: Logics for False Belief.Christopher Steinsvold - 2011 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 52 (3):245-253.
Public Goods and Fairness.Garrett Cullity - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):1 – 21.
论积极的中庸——进取互利.Li-Jing Wang & Xin Xie - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10:601-612.
A Legal Right to Do Legal Wrong.Ori J. Herstein - 2013 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (1):gqt022.
Mad, Bad, or Disagreeing? On Moral Competence and Responsibility.Maureen Sie - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (3):262 – 281.
The Reification of Life.Michael Hauskeller - 2007 - Genomics, Society and Policy 3 (2):70-81.
Defending the Right To Do Wrong.Ori J. Herstein - 2012 - Law and Philosophy 31 (3):343-365.
Right and Wrong.Charles Fried - 1978 - Harvard University Press.
Third Parties and the Social Scaffolding of Forgiveness.Margaret Urban Walker - 2013 - Journal of Religious Ethics 41 (3):495-512.
A Paradox for Weak Deontology.Michael Huemer - 2009 - Utilitas 21 (4):464-477.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-11-05

Total views
885 ( #4,242 of 2,330,885 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
99 ( #4,848 of 2,330,885 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes