Comments on Richard Jeffrey

Synthese 30 (1-2):135 - 138 (1975)
Abstract
In this commentary, after first summarizing the three major theses of Jeffrey's paper Probability and Falsification: Critique of the Popper Program, and sketching out what I take to be his central argument, I criticize Jeffrey on two grounds. The first is that he has failed to explain why his version of Bayesianism provides us with better theories upon which to make decisions; the second is that he has offered a theory about decision-making that by-passes the important question: How can we make more rational decisions?
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DOI 10.1007/BF00485301
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