Democratically relevant alternatives

Analysis 69 (1):9-17 (2009)
Abstract
Many paradoxes have been revealed in the theory of democracy over the years. This article points to yet another paradox at the heart of democracy, whether in its aggregative or deliberative form.The paradox is this: If you are dealing with a large and heterogeneous community, in which people's choices are menu-sensitive in diverse ways, and if people's cognitive capacities preclude them from considering all items on a large menu simultaneouslythen individuals’ choices may be unstable and manipulable depending on how choices over cognitively-manageable subsets of the menu are partitioned and sequenced, 1 and the collective choice may be likewise unstable and manipulable in consequence.Aggregative democracy casts this argument in terms of ‘alternatives’ on the menu for choice. Deliberative democracy casts this argument in terms of ‘considerations’. The same formal problem arises in both cases
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/analys/ann002
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 29,820
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Pragmatic Rationality and Rules.Edward F. Mcclennen - 1997 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 (3):210-258.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
The Feasibility of Collectives' Actions.Holly Lawford-Smith - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):453-467.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-02-23

Total downloads
91 ( #61,798 of 2,210,133 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #382,810 of 2,210,133 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature