Environmental Ethics 2 (3):281-284 (1980)
Contrary to W. Murray Hunt’s suggestion, living things deserve moral consideration and inanimate objects do not precisely because living things can intelligibly be said to have interests (and inanimate objects cannot intelligibly said to have interests). Interests are crucial because the concept of morality is noncontingently related to beneficence or nonmaleficence, notions which misfire completely in theabsence of entities capable of being benefited or harmed
|Keywords||Applied Philosophy General Interest|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
On Stopping at Everything: A Reply to W. M. Hunt.Kenneth E. Goodpaster - 1980 - Environmental Ethics 2 (3):281-284.
Two Arguments Against Biological Interests.Aaron Simmons - 2010 - Environmental Ethics 32 (3):229-245.
Machines, Sentience, and the Scope of Morality.Frederik Kaufman - 1994 - Environmental Ethics 16 (1):57-70.
For the Sake of a Stone? Inanimate Things and the Demands of Morality.Simon P. James - 2011 - Inquiry 54 (4):384-397.
To Swat or Not to Swat: Pesky Flies, Environmental Ethics, and the Supererogatory.Mark A. Michael - 1996 - Environmental Ethics 18 (2):165-180.
Toward the Moral Considerability of Species and Ecosystems.Lawrence E. Johnson - 1992 - Environmental Ethics 14 (2):145-157.
No Safe Harbor: The Principle of Complicity and the Practice of Voluntary Stopping of Eating and Drinking.Lynn A. Jansen - 2004 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 29 (1):61 – 74.
Is Artefactualness a Value-Relevant Property of Living Things?Ronald Sandler - 2012 - Synthese 185 (1):89-102.
Is Equal Moral Consideration Really Compatible with Unequal Moral Status?John Rossi - 2010 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 20 (3):251-276.
The Likelihood Principle and the Reliability of Experiments.Andrew Backe - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):361.
Added to index2011-12-01
Total downloads22 ( #226,134 of 2,163,896 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #348,100 of 2,163,896 )
How can I increase my downloads?