Parfit and the sorites paradox

Philosophical Studies 2 (2):113-20 (1996)

Jerry Goodenough
University of East Anglia
This paper aims to establish that Sorites reasoning, a fundamental part of Parfit's work, is more destructive that he intends. I establish the form that Parfit's arguments take and then substitute premises whose acceptability to Parfit I show. The new argument demonstrates an eliminativism or immaterialism concerning persons which Parfit must find repugnant
Keywords Metaphysics  Paradox  Personal Identity  Sorites  Parfit, D
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DOI 10.1007/BF00354285
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