Talking about intentional objects

Dialectica 60 (2):135-144 (2006)
Abstract
Discusses the old problem of how to characterize apparently intentional states that appear to lack objects. In tandem with critically discussing a recent proposal by Tim Crane, I develop the line of reasoning according to which talking about intentional objects is really a way of talking about intentional states—in particular, it’s a way of talking about their satisfaction-conditions.
Keywords Existence  Intentional  Metaphysics  Object  Truth  Crane, Tim
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2006.01051.x
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References found in this work BETA
From a Logical Point of View.W. V. Quine - 1953 - Harvard University Press.
Intentional Objects.Tim Crane - 2001 - Ratio 14 (4):298-317.
Logische Untersuchungen.Edmund Husserl - 1900 - Felix Meiner Verlag.
Objects as Intentional and as Real.Alberto Voltolini - 1991 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 41:1-32.

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