American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (January):11-36 (1974)
I attempt to show that when someone is, E.G., Angry about something, The events or states that conjointly are causing him to be angry conform to a certain structure, And that from the causal structure underlying his anger it is possible to 'read out' what he is angry about. In this respect, And even in some of the details of the structure, My analysis of being angry about something resembles the belief-Want analysis of intentional action. The chief elements of the causal structure I describe are a belief and an attitude so related in content as to constitute either a wish-Frustration (in the case of negative emotions) or a wish-Satisfaction (in the case of positive emotions). The analysis makes otiose, In those cases for which it is a correct analysis, The mysterious non-Causal relation between an emotion and its 'object' which is invoked by the majority of philosophers now writing on emotions
|Keywords||Believing Drug Emotion Epistemology Knowing Object Wanting|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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