The Concept of Truth in Feminist Sciences

Hypatia 10 (3):99 - 116 (1995)
Geoffrey Gorham
Macalester College
If we view the aim of feminist science as truthlikeness, instead of either absolute or relative truth, then we can explain the sense in which the feminist sciences bring an objective advance in knowledge without implicating One True Theory. I argue that a certain non-linguistic theory of truthlikeness is especially well-suited to this purpose and complements the feminist epistemologies of Harding, Haraway, and Longino.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1527-2001.1995.tb00739.x
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How the Laws of Physics Lie.Nancy Cartwright - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach.Ronald N. Giere - 1988 - Philosophical Review 100 (4):653-656.

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