The Minimal Approval View of Attributability

In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 6. Oxford University Press (2019)
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Abstract

This paper advances a new agentially undemanding account of the conditions of attributability, the Minimal Approval account, and argues that it has a number of advantages over traditional Deep Self theories, including the way in which it handles agents with conditions like addiction, Tourette syndrome, and misophonia. It is argued that in order for an agent to be attributionally responsible, the mental process that leads to her action must dispose her to be such that she would, upon reflec-tion, approve to some minimal degree of being moved to action by the motive on which she in fact acts.

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August Gorman
Oakland University

Citations of this work

What is the Difference between Weakness of Will and Compulsion?August Gorman - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (1):37-52.
Demystifying the Deep Self View.August Gorman - 2022 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 19 (4):390-414.
A moral freedom to which we might aspire.Andrew Eshleman - 2023 - Philosophical Explorations 27 (1):1-20.

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