Abstract

The present contribution presents a series of distributions of the apriori in different phases of Husserl’s phenomenology: eidetic vs. categorial apriori in the Idea of Phaenomenology, formal vs. contingent apriori in the Formal and Transcendental Logic, and the distinction of the universal objective apriori and the universal apriori of the life-world in the Crisis of the European Sciences. The introduction of genetic phenomenology, it is argued, gradually turns the formal apriori’s initially proclaimed independence of the material apriori to its opposite. In the Formal and Transcendental Logic, the foundational role of the contingent-material apriori with regard to the formal apriori is still qualified by the contingence of this material apriori relative to pure subjectivity. The Crisis, finally, unconditionally articulates the universal apriori of the lifeworld as the foundation of the universal objective apriori.