Authors
Dana Goswick
University of Melbourne
Abstract
Causal overdetermination – i.e. instances in which x, y, and z all occur and intuitively the occurrence of x alone is sufficient for the occurrence of z and the occurrence of y alone is sufficient for the occurrence of z – has long been considered a problem for counterfactual analyses of causation. Intuitively, we want to say both x and y caused z, but standard Lewisian counterfactual analysis yields the result that neither x nor y caused z. David Lewis, himself, suggested that overdetermination ought to be left as “spoils to the victor”. I show how, if we modify Lewis’ account of events slightly, we can bring counterfactual analysis in line with our intuitions about overdetermination
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References found in this work BETA

Mind in a Physical World.Jaegwon Kim - 2001 - Noûs 35 (2):304-316.
Events.David Lewis - 1986 - In Philosophical Papers Vol. II. Oxford University Press. pp. 241-269.
Causes and Counterfactuals.Jaegwon Kim - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):570-572.

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