Philosophical Methodology in Modal Epistemology

Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):183-195 (2012)
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Abstract

This paper examines the legitimacy of two common methodologies within philosophy: thought experiments and conceptual analysis. In particular, I examine the uses to which these two methodologies have been put within modal epistemology. I argue that, although both methods can be used to reveal conditional essentialist claims (e.g. necessarily: if x is water, then x is H20), neither can be used to reveal the de re essentialists claims (e.g. x is water and x is essentially H20) they’re often taken to reveal.

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Dana Goswick
University of Melbourne

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References found in this work

From a Logical Point of View.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1953 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
New work for a theory of universals.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

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