Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):11 (2012)

Authors
Dana Goswick
University of Melbourne
Abstract
This paper examines the legitimacy of two common methodologies within philosophy: thought experiments and conceptual analysis. In particular, I examine the uses to which these two methodologies have been put within modal epistemology. I argue that, although both methods can be used to reveal conditional essentialist claims , neither can be used to reveal the de re essentialists claims they’re often taken to reveal.
Keywords Applied Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy
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DOI 10.5840/eip201213111
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From a Logical Point of View.W. V. O. Quine - 1953 - Harvard University Press.
New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
The Structure of Objects.Kathrin Koslicki - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic.David K. Lewis - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (5):113-126.

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