Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (7-8):103-123 (2015)

Joseph Gottlieb
Texas Tech University
Experiences, by definition, have phenomenal character. But many experiences have a specific type of phenomenal character: presentational character. While both visual experience and conscious thought make us aware of their objects, only in visual experience do objects seem present before the mind and available for direct access. I argue that Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theories of consciousness have a particularly steep hill to climb in accommodating presentational character.
Keywords Conciousness  Higher-Order Thought Theory  Presentational Character
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References found in this work BETA

The HOROR Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness.Richard Brown - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1783-1794.

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On Ambitious Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness.Joseph Gottlieb - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (3):421-441.
The Higher-Order Map Theory of Consciousness.Joseph Gottlieb - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (1):131-148.
Perceptual Consciousness Plays No Epistemic Role.Jacob Berger - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):7-23.

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