Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):346-364 (2022)

Joseph Gottlieb
Texas Tech University
I am a person. But am I fundamentally and essentially a person? The animalist says no. So must the phenomenal continuity theorist, or so I will argue. Even if, contra animalism, we cannot survive zombification, being a subject of experience is not sufficient for being a person, and phenomenal continuity is not sufficient for our survival as the same person over time. These observations point the way to a positive account of personhood, and provide further insight into the conditions under which literal survival preserves what matters.
Keywords personal identity  access consciousness  phenomenal continuity  forensic personhood  vegetative state
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DOI 10.1093/pq/pqab037
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Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.

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