Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):338-362 (2011)
Hubert Dreyfus has defended a novel view of agency, most notably in his debate with John McDowell. Dreyfus argues that expert actions are primarily unreflective and do not involve conceptual activity. In unreflective action, embodied know-how plays the role reflection and conceptuality play in the actions of novices. Dreyfus employs two arguments to support his conclusion: the argument from speed and the phenomenological argument. I argue that Dreyfus's argumentative strategies are not successful, since he relies on a dubious assumption about concepts and reflection. I suggest that Dreyfus is committed to a minimal view of conceptuality in action
|Keywords||Hubert Dreyfus John McDowell Action Non-Conceptual Unreflective Action Phenomenology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Citations of this work BETA
Rationalizing Flow: Agency in Skilled Unreflective Action.Michael Brownstein - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):545-568.
Know-How, Procedural Knowledge, and Choking Under Pressure.Gabriel Gottlieb - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (2):361-378.
Just Doing What I Do: On the Awareness of Fluent Agency.James M. Dow - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (1):155-177.
Know-How as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
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