Authors
Joseph Gottlieb
Texas Tech University
Abstract
The primary aim of a theory of consciousness is to articulate existence conditions for conscious states, i.e. the conditions under which a mental state is conscious rather than unconscious. There are two main broad approaches: The Higher-Order approach and the First-Order approach. Higher-Order theories claim that a mental state is conscious only if it is the object of a suitable state of higher-order awareness. First-Order theories reject this necessary condition. However, both sides make the following claim: for any mental state M of a subject S, M is conscious if there is something it is like for S to be in M. This is the Nagelian Conception of consciousness. Taking the Nagelian Conception as a starting point, I contend that the best rationalizing explanation for the ways in which Higher-Order and First-Order theorists contribute to their dispute is to see those contributions as consistent responses to two distinct questions.
Keywords Consciousnesss  What it is like  Higher-Order Theories  First-Order Theories  Verbal Disputes
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0005.012
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,355
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Transitivity and Transparency.Joseph Gottlieb - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (4):353-379.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

On Ambitious Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness.Joseph Gottlieb - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (3):421-441.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Collapse Argument.Joseph Gottlieb - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):1-20.
The HOROR Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness.Richard Brown - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1783-1794.
Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation, and Function.David Rosenthal - 2012 - Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation and Function 367 (1594):1424-1438.
The Same-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 143--170.
Appendage Theory -- Pro and Con.Thomas Natsoulas - 1992 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 13 (4):371-96.
Quotational Higher-Order Thought Theory.Sam Coleman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2705-2733.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-04-04

Total views
77 ( #151,852 of 2,519,593 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #100,565 of 2,519,593 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes