Philosophy Compass 9 (11):803-813 (2014)

Authors
Laura Gow
University of Antwerp
Abstract
The view that physical objects do not, in fact, possess colour properties is certainly the dominant position amongst scientists working on colour vision. It is also a reasonably popular view amongst philosophers. However, the recent philosophical debate about the metaphysical status of colour properties seems to have taken a more realist turn. In this article, I review the main philosophical views – eliminativism, physicalism, dispositionalism and primitivism – and describe the problems they face. I also examine how these views have been classified and suggest that there may be less disparity between some of these positions than previously thought
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/phc3.12173
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 62,363
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.John Locke - 1689 - Oxford University Press.
Critique of Pure Reason.Immanuel Kant - 1991 - In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Blackwell. pp. 449-451.
Values and Secondary Qualities.John McDowell - 1985 - In Ted Honderich (ed.), Morality and Objectivity. London: Routledge. pp. 110-129.

View all 42 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Debunking Arguments in Metaethics and Metaphysics.Daniel Z. Korman - 2019 - In Alvin Goldman & Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Metaphysics and Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press. pp. 337-363.
Everything is Clear: All Perceptual Experiences Are Transparent.Laura Gow - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):412-425.
The Limitations of Perceptual Transparency.Laura Gow - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):723-744.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Colour Irrealism and the Formation of Colour Concepts.Jonathan Ellis - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):53-73.
Can the Physicalist Explain Colour Structure in Terms of Colour Experience?1.Adam Pautz - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):535 – 564.
Colour, Philosophical Perspectives.Adam Pautz - 2009 - In Axel Cleeremans, Patrick Wilken & Tim Bayne (eds.), Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press. pp. 144-149.
Qualia and the Senses.Peter W. Ross - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):495-511.
Insights From the Colour Category Controversy.Tony Belpaeme - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):75-76.
Is Colour Composition Phenomenal?Vivian Mizrahi - 2009 - In D. Skusevich & P. Matikas (eds.), Color Perception: Physiology, Processes and Analysis. Nova Science Publishers.
Colour: Physical or Phenomenal?Russell Wahl & Jonathan Westphal - 1998 - Philosophy 73 (284):301-304.
Surface Colour is Not a Perceptual Content.Damon Crockett - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):303-318.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-11-07

Total views
95 ( #112,176 of 62,332 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
20 ( #36,921 of 62,332 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes