Philosophy Compass 9 (11):803-813 (2014)
AbstractThe view that physical objects do not, in fact, possess colour properties is certainly the dominant position amongst scientists working on colour vision. It is also a reasonably popular view amongst philosophers. However, the recent philosophical debate about the metaphysical status of colour properties seems to have taken a more realist turn. In this article, I review the main philosophical views – eliminativism, physicalism, dispositionalism and primitivism – and describe the problems they face. I also examine how these views have been classified and suggest that there may be less disparity between some of these positions than previously thought
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An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.John Locke - 1689 - London, England: Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work
Debunking Arguments in Metaethics and Metaphysics.Daniel Z. Korman - 2019 - In Alvin Goldman & Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Metaphysics and Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press. pp. 337-363.
Everything is Clear: All Perceptual Experiences Are Transparent.Laura Gow - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):412-425.
The Limitations of Perceptual Transparency.Laura Gow - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):723-744.
Colour Hallucination: A New Problem for Externalist Representationalism.Laura Gow - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):695-704.
Quality-Space Functionalism About Color.Jacob Berger - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (3):138-164.
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