Ratio 31 (S1):35-50 (2018)

Abstract
Externalist representationalism is touted as a superior rival to naïve realism, and yet a careful analysis of the externalist representationalist's analysis of our ordinary perceptual experiences shows the view to be far closer to naïve realism than we might have expected. One of the central advertised benefits of representationalist views in general is that they are compatible with the idea that ordinary, illusory and hallucinatory perceptual experiences are of the same fundamental kind. Naïve realists are forced to deny the ‘common fundamental kind claim’ and adopt disjunctivism. However, I argue that externalist representationalism is also a version of disjunctivism. Consequently, one of the main rivals to naïve realism turns out not to be a rival at all.
Keywords Disjunctivism  Naïve Realism  Perception  Perceptual Experience  Representationalism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/rati.12175
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,636
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Transparency of Experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.
Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - Philosophy 72 (279):150-154.
The Problems of Philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - Mind 21 (84):556-564.
The Limits of Self-Awareness.Michael G. F. Martin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):37-89.

View all 52 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Must Naive Realists Be Relationalists?Maarten Steenhagen - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (4):1002-1015.
When Nothing Looks Blue.Joseph Gottlieb & Ali Rezaei - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2553-2561.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Causal Argument Against Disjunctivism.Michael Sollberger - 2007 - Facta Philosophica 9 (1):245-267.
Disjunctivism.Berit Brogaard - 2010 - Oxford Annotated Bibliographies Online.
Representationalism and the Problem of Vagueness.Ryan Perkins & Tim Bayne - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (1):71-86.
Disjunctivism and Scepticism.Duncan Pritchard & Chris Ranalli - forthcoming - In Baron Reed & Diego E. Machuca (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. Bloomsbury Academic.
The Rise and Fall of Disjunctivism.Walter Horn - 2013 - Abstracta 7 (1):1-15.
Naïve Realism Without Disjunctivism About Experience.Matthew Conduct - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):727-736.
Causation in Perception: A Challenge to Naïve Realism.Michael Sollberger - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4):581-595.
Transparency and Imagining Seeing.Fabian Dorsch - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):173-200.
Naïve Realism and Illusion.Boyd Millar - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2:607-625.
Recent Work on Naive Realism.James Genone - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (1).
Why Naive Realism?Heather Logue - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2):211-237.
The Phenomenological Problem of Perception.Boyd Millar - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):625-654.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-08-03

Total views
66 ( #166,179 of 2,462,264 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #144,199 of 2,462,264 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes