Axiomathes 18 (1):117-126 (2008)

Authors
Simone Gozzano
Università degli Studi dell'Aquila
Abstract
In recent times, Evans’ idea that mental states could have non-conceptual contents has been attacked. McDowell (Mind and World, 1994) and Brewer (Perception and reason, 1999) have both argued that that notion does not have any epistemological role because notions such as justification or evidential support, that might relate mental contents to each other, must be framed in conceptual terms. On his side, Brewer has argued that instead of non-conceptual content we should consider demonstrative concepts that have the same fine grainess of non-conceptual contents while having conceptual structure. In what follows I will argue that, first, that the notion of demonstrative concept is not viable and, second, that there is an epistemological role for non-conceptual content.
Keywords non-conceptual content  mental content
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s10516-007-9024-x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Mind and World.John Mcdowell - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):99-109.
Perception and Reason.Bill Brewer - 1999 - Oxford University Press.

View all 41 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Non-Conceptualism and the Problem of Perceptual Self-Knowledge.Robert Hanna & Monima Chadha - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):184-223.
Jerry Fodor on Non-Conceptual Content.Katalin Balog - 2009 - Synthese 167 (3):311 - 320.
How to Think About Nonconceptual Content.Walter Hopp - 2010 - The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy 10 (1):1-24.
Kantian Non-Conceptualism.Robert Hanna - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (1):41 - 64.
Grain and Content.Stephen Neale - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:353-358.
Perceptual Experience has Conceptual Content.Bill Brewer - 2005 - In Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
Non-Conceptual Experiential Content and Reason-Giving.Hemdat Lerman - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):1-23.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
518 ( #17,463 of 2,520,779 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #79,279 of 2,520,779 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes