Rationality, folk psychology, and the belief-opinion distinction

Acta Analytica 12 (12):113-123 (1994)
Authors
Simone Gozzano
Università degli Studi dell'Aquila
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to clarify the role of the distinction between belief and opinion in the light of Dennett's intentional stance. In particular, I consider whether the distinction could be used for a defence of the stance from various criticisms. I will then apply the distinction to the so-called `paradoxes of irrationality'. In this context I will propose that we should avoid the postulation of `boundaries' or `gaps' within the mind, and will attempt to show that a useful treatment of the paradoxes can be obtained by revising the rationality assumption
Keywords Belief  Epistemology  Folk Psychology  Rationality  Dennett, D
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