The Compatibility of Downward Causation and Emergence

In Michele Paolini Paoletti & Francesco Orilia, Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives on Downward Causation. New York: Routledge. pp. 296-312 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper, I shall argue that both emergence and downward causation, which are strongly interconnected, presuppose the presence of levels of reality. However, emergence and downward causation pull in opposite directions with respect to my best reconstruction of what levels are. The upshot is that emergence stresses the autonomy among levels while downward causation puts the distinction between levels at risk of a reductio ad absurdum, with the further consequence of blurring the very notion of downward. Therefore, emergence and downward causation are not fit to each other vis-a-vis the concept of level.

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

Levels, Emergence, and Three Versions of Downward Causation.Claus Emmeche, Simo Koppe & Frederick Stjernfelt - 2000 - In P. B. Andersen, Claus Emmeche, N. O. Finnemann & P. V. Christiansen, Downward Causation. Aarhus, Denmark: University of Aarhus Press. pp. 322-348.
Three Grades of Downward Causation.Francesco Orilia & Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2017 - In Michele Paolini Paoletti & Francesco Orilia, Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives on Downward Causation. New York: Routledge. pp. 25-41.
Emergence and Reflexive Downward.John Symons - 2002 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 6 (1):183–201.
Demystifying Downward Causation in Biology.Yasmin Haddad - 2024 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 55:1-18.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-08-29

Downloads
955 (#24,472)

6 months
185 (#20,880)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Simone Gozzano
Università degli Studi dell'Aquila

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

From an ontological point of view.John Heil - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Minds and Machines.Hilary Putnam - 1960 - In Sidney Hook, Dimensions Of Mind: A Symposium. NY: NEW YORK University Press. pp. 138-164.
Physical Causation.Phil Dowe - 2000 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

View all 41 references / Add more references