American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4):365-376 (2010)

Authors
Richard Gray
Cardiff University
Abstract
Reductive externalist versions of representationalism hold that there is an externalist theory of content which is adequate for underwriting their claim that the character of experience can be reductively explained by the external physical properties represented by experience. In this paper such theories of content are shown to be inadequate, thus undermining the reductive explanation of the character of experience by the content of experience. It is argued that the character of experience is better explained non-reductively by reference to modes of presentation of the properties of things.
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References found in this work BETA

Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Philosophy 72 (282):602-604.
Misrepresentation.Fred Dretske - 1986 - In R. Bogdan (ed.), Belief: Form, Content, and Function. Oxford University Press. pp. 17--36.
The Components of Content.David Chalmers - 2002 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press.
Colour Constancy as Counterfactual.Jonathan Cohen - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):61 – 92.

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