Episteme 17 (3):349-363 (2020)

Authors
Peter Graham
University of California, Riverside
Abstract
How should we undertand the role of norms – especially epistemic norms – governing assertive speech acts? Mitchell Green has argued that these norms play the role of handicaps in the technical sense from the animal signals literature. As handicaps, they then play a large role in explaining the reliability – and so the stability – of assertive speech acts. But though norms of assertion conceived of as social norms do indeed play this stabilizing role, these norms are best understood as deterrents and not as handicaps. This paper explains the stability problem for the maintenance of animal signals, and so human communication; the mechanics of the handicap principle; the role of deterrents and punishments as an alternative mechanism; and the role of social norms governing assertion for the case of human communication.
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DOI 10.1017/epi.2019.53
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References found in this work BETA

Knowing and Asserting.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):489.
Epistemic Normativity and Social Norms.Peter J. Graham - 2015 - In David Henderson & John Greco (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 247-273.
``Knowing and Asserting&Quot.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):489-523.

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