Belief and the limits of irrationality

Abstract

(I) It is commonly held that a person cannot wittingly hold false or inconsistent beliefs. Edgley has argued that this follows from the normative implications involved in the concept of belief and the concept of a proposition, as expressed in the analytic principle 'if p, then it is right to think that p\ (II) But the principle, when taken in its analytic sense, does not have the required implications; and taken in the sense in which it would have those implications it is neither analytic nor true. (III) A person can not only hold a false belief wittingly, he can assert that he does. Examples are given to exhibit the legitimacy of the claim that such irrationality does not necessarily dissolve when recognized for what it is. (IV) The phenomenon of self-confessed irrationality involves the fusion of two general features of mental life. It comprises a mental state over whose existence one has no control, but which one can in some way detach oneself from and be critical of.

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,856

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-03-05

Downloads
12 (#817,014)

6 months
1 (#386,040)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work

A Critique of Popper's Conception of the Relationship Between Logic, Psychology, and a Critical Epistemology.John Krige - 1978 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 21 (1-4):313 – 335.
I. Graham on the Logic of Belief.John Krige - 1976 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 19 (1-4):355-360.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Rationality of Grief.Carolyn Price - 2010 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):20-40.
Incoherence and Irrationality.Donald Davidson - 1985 - Dialectica 39 (4):345-54.
Naughty Beliefs.Andrew Huddleston - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):209-222.
Motivated Irrationality.Alfred R. Mele - 2004 - In Alfred R. Mele & Piers Rawling (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford University Press.
Schizophrenia, Mental Capacity, and Rational Suicide.Jeanette Hewitt - 2010 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (1):63-77.