Journal of the History of Philosophy 16 (4):415-434 (1978)
Berkeley held space to be relational. On the other hand, He took extension to be composed of absolute minima. This paper offers an analysis of berkeley's views on the nature of minimum visibles and space and related notions, E.G., Distance, Extension, And figure. The difficulties in his theory are clearest in the analysis of figure where it is argued that minima can have neither figure nor extension and that, Contrary to berkeley's view, Extension and figure cannot be composed of such minima. The paper concludes by arguing that the "esse est percipi" doctrine is false, Since it entails that there are minimum visibles and that distances be specifiable in terms of minimum visible distances
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