Philosophical Psychology 14 (1):65-82 (2001)

Authors
Richard Gray
Cardiff University
Abstract
Fodor claims that cognitive modules can be thought of as constituting a psychological natural kind in virtue of their possession of most or all of nine specified properties. The challenge to this considered here comes from synaesthesia. Synaesthesia is a type of cross-modal association: input to one sensory modality reliably generates an additional sensory output that is usually generated by the input to a distinct sensory modality. The most common form of synaesthesia manifests Fodor's nine specified properties of modularity, and hence, according to Segal (1997), it should be understood as involving an extra module. Many psychologists believe that synaesthesia involves a breakdown in modularity. After outlining how both theories can explain the manifestation of the nine alleged properties of modularity in synaesthesia, I discuss the two concepts of function which initially motivate the respective theories. I argue that only a teleological concept of function is properly able to adjudicate between the two theories. The upshot is a further application of so-called externalist considerations to mental phenomena
Keywords Cognitive Science  Module  Natural Kinds  Psychology  Science  Synaesthesia
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DOI 10.1080/09515080120033562
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References found in this work BETA

The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.
Functional Analysis.Robert Cummins - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (November):741-64.
The Modularity of Mind. [REVIEW]Robert Cummins - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101-108.
Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction.Jaegwon Kim - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):1-26.

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Citations of this work BETA

Rethinking Synesthesia.Michael Sollberger - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):171 - 187.
You Can See What 'I' Means.Jennifer Matey - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (1):57-70.
Synaesthesia and Misrepresentation: A Reply to Wager.Richard Gray - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (3):339-46.
Synaesthesia Misrepresented.A. Wager - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (3):347-351.

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