Philosophia 37 (3):373-378 (2009)

Giovanni B. Grandi
University of British Columbia
According to Daniel Flage, Berkeley thinks that all necessary truths are founded on acts of will that assign meanings to words. After briefly commenting on the air of paradox contained in the title of Flage’s paper, and on the historical accuracy of Berkeley’s understanding of the abstractionist tradition, I make some remarks on two points made by Flage. Firstly, I discuss Flage’s distinction between the ontological ground of a necessary truth and our knowledge of a necessary truth. Secondly, I discuss Flage’s attempt to show that, according to Berkeley, the resemblance relation does not constitute a necessary connection.
Keywords George Berkeley  Daniel Flage  Abstraction  Meaning  Necessary truth
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-008-9148-2
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