Biology and Philosophy 9 (1):85-97 (1994)
Hull's recent work in evolutionary epistemology is marred by a deep tension. While he maintains that conceptual and biological evolution are both driven by selection processes, he also claims that only the former is globally progressive. In this paper I formulate this tension and present four possible responses (including Hull's). I argue that Hull's position rests on the assumption that there is a goal which is sufficiently general to describe most scientific activity yet precise enough to guide research. Working from within Hull's framework, I argue that a non-progressionist stance is both preferable and more consistent with Hull's basic commitments.
|Keywords||Progress evolutionary epistemology|
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The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change. [REVIEW]David Zaret - 1977 - Philosophical Review 90 (1):146-149.
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