How to be realistic about folk psychology

Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):69-81 (1988)

Authors
Terry Horgan
University of Arizona
George Graham
Georgia State University
Abstract
Folk psychological realism is the view that folk psychology is true and that people really do have propositional attitudes, whereas anti-realism is the view that folk psychology is false and people really do not have propositional attitudes. We argue that anti-realism is not worthy of acceptance and that realism is eminently worthy of acceptance. However, it is plainly epistemically possible to favor either of two forms of folk realism: scientific or non-scientific. We argue that non-scientific realism, while perhaps unpopular among philosophers of mind, is a distinct form of realism from scientific realism, and that it is not yet knowable whether scientific or non-scientific realism is true. We also outline how adopting realism, but remaining neutral between scientific and non-scientific realism, offers fresh insights into such topics as instrumentalism, supervenience, the language of thought hypothesis, and elimin-ativism.
Keywords Metaphysics  Propositional Attitudes  Psychology  Realism  Reduction  Scientific
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DOI 10.1080/09515088808572926
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References found in this work BETA

Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.
How the Laws of Physics Lie.Nancy Cartwright - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Understanding Interests and Causal Explanation.Petri Ylikoski - 2001 - Dissertation, University of Helsinki
The Structures of the Common-Sense World.Barry Smith - 1995 - Acta Philosophica Fennica 58:290–317.
In Defense of Southern Fundamentalism.Terence Horgan & George Graham - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 62 (May):107-134.
Melancholic Epistemology.George Graham - 1990 - Synthese 82 (3):399-422.
The Austere Ideology of Folk Psychology.Terence E. Horgan - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (2):282-297.

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