Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):69-81 (1988)
Folk psychological realism is the view that folk psychology is true and that people really do have propositional attitudes, whereas anti-realism is the view that folk psychology is false and people really do not have propositional attitudes. We argue that anti-realism is not worthy of acceptance and that realism is eminently worthy of acceptance. However, it is plainly epistemically possible to favor either of two forms of folk realism: scientific or non-scientific. We argue that non-scientific realism, while perhaps unpopular among philosophers of mind, is a distinct form of realism from scientific realism, and that it is not yet knowable whether scientific or non-scientific realism is true. We also outline how adopting realism, but remaining neutral between scientific and non-scientific realism, offers fresh insights into such topics as instrumentalism, supervenience, the language of thought hypothesis, and elimin-ativism.
|Keywords||Metaphysics Propositional Attitudes Psychology Realism Reduction Scientific|
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References found in this work BETA
From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief.Stephen P. Stich - 1983 - MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Attitudes, Leprechauns and Neutrinos: The Ontology of Behavioral Science.Marthe Chandler - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 60 (1-2):5 - 17.
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