Intelligent Design and Selective History: Two Sources of Purpose and Plan

In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 3. Oxford University Press. pp. 67-88 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Alvin Plantinga argues by counterexample that no naturalistic account of functions is possible--God is then the only source for natural functions. This paper replies to Plantinga's examples and arguments. Plantinga misunderstands naturalistic accounts. Plantinga's mistakes flow from his assimilation of functional notions in general to functions from intentional design in particular.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Problem Of Religious Nature Of Intelligent Design Theory.Dariusz Sagan - 2011 - Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia 6 (4):55-74.
A Scientific and Religious Critique of Intelligent Design.Stephen Matheson - 2010 - In Melville Y. Stewart (ed.), Science and Religion in Dialogue. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 278--289.
Explanation of Intelligent Design and its Challenges with Evolutionary Theory.Haleh Abdollahi Rad - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Investigations 10 (19):303-326.
Explanation of Intelligent Design and its Challenges with Evolutionary Theory.Haleh Abdollahi Rad - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Investigations at University of Tabriz 10 (19):303-326.
Steve Fuller and Intelligent Design.Jeremy Shearmur - 2010 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (3):433-445.
Intelligent Design and the End of Science.Jeffrey Koperski - 2003 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 77 (4):567-588.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-05-01

Downloads
1,056 (#11,969)

6 months
181 (#15,028)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Peter Graham
University of California, Riverside

Citations of this work

Epistemic Entitlement.Peter J. Graham - 2012 - Noûs 46 (3):449-482.
Proper Functionalism and the Organizational Theory of Functions.Peter J. Graham - 2023 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira (ed.), Externalism about Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 249-276.
Why is Warrant Normative?Peter J. Graham - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):110-128.
Does Justification Aim at Truth?Peter J. Graham - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):51-72.
How to be minimalist about shared agency.Jules Salomone-Sehr - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references