In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Volume 3. Oxford University Press. pp. 67-88 (2011)

Authors
Peter Graham
University of California, Riverside
Abstract
Alvin Plantinga argues by counterexample that no naturalistic account of functions is possible--God is then the only source for natural functions. This paper replies to Plantinga's examples and arguments. Plantinga misunderstands naturalistic accounts. Plantinga's mistakes flow from his assimilation of functional notions in general to functions from intentional design in particular.
Keywords Alvin Plantinga  Functions  Intelligent Design
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Epistemic Entitlement.Peter J. Graham - 2012 - Noûs 46 (3):449-482.
Why is Warrant Normative?Peter J. Graham - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):110-128.
Does Justification Aim at Truth?Peter J. Graham - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):51-72.

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