Indistinguishable Senses

Noûs 54 (1):78-104 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Fregeanism and Relationism are competing families of solutions to Frege’s Puzzle, and by extension, competing theories of propositional representation. My aim is to clarify what is at stake between them by characterizing and evaluating a Relationist argument. Relationists claim that it is cognitively possible for distinct token propositional attitudes to be, in a sense, qualitatively indistinguishable: to differ in no intrinsic representational features. The idea of an ‘intrinsic representational feature’ is not, however, made especially clear in the argument. I clarify it here and, having done so, offer reason to doubt the argument. This will put us in a position to draw some lessons about the relation between object-directed and representation-internal aspects of cognitive significance.

Similar books and articles

Taxonomising the Senses.Fiona Macpherson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (1):123-142.
The significance of the senses.Matthew Nudds - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):31-51.
On the Nature of the Senses.Richard Gray - 2011 - In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), The Senses: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press.
The number of senses.Kevin C. Klement - 2003 - Erkenntnis 58 (3):303 - 323.
Discriminating senses.Matthew Nudds - 2009 - The Philosophers' Magazine 45:92-98.
The Space of Sensory Modalities.Fiona Macpherson - 2014 - In Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen & Stephen Biggs (eds.), Perception and Its Modalities. Oxford University Press.
Probability and the Evidence of our Senses.D. H. Mellor - 1991 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 30:117-128.
Representations - senses and reasons.Benny Shanon - 1991 - Philosophical Psychology 4 (3):355-74.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-05-11

Downloads
608 (#21,622)

6 months
124 (#14,271)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Aidan Gray
University of Illinois, Chicago

Citations of this work

Mental filing.Rachel Goodman & Aidan Gray - 2022 - Noûs 56 (1):204-226.
Minimal Fregeanism.Aidan Gray - 2022 - Mind 131 (522):429-458.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Mental Files.François Recanati - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.

View all 46 references / Add more references