Axiomathes 18 (1):37-48 (2008)
Popper emphasised both the problem-solving nature of human knowledge, and the need to criticise a scientific theory as strongly as possible. These aims seem to contradict each other, in that the former stresses the problems that motivate scientific theories while the one ignores the character of the problems that led to the formation of the theories against which the criticism is directed. A resolution is proposed in which problems as such are taken as prime in the search for knowledge, and subject to discussion. This approach is then applied to the problem of induction. Popper set great stake to his solution of it, but others doubted its legitimacy, in ways that are clarified by changing the form of the induction problem itself. That change draws upon logic, which is the subject of another application: namely, in contrast to Popper’s adhesion to classical logic as the only welcome form (because of the maximal strength of criticism that it dispenses), can other logics be used without abandoning his philosophy of criticism?
|Keywords||Testing theories Induction Popper Logics in science|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Popper, Laws, and the Exclusion of Biology From Genuine Science.David N. Stamos - 2007 - Acta Biotheoretica 55 (4):357-375.
The 'Popperian Programme' and Mathematics - Part II: From Quasi-Empiricism to Mathematical Research Programmes.E. Glas - 2001 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 32 (2):355-376.
Popper's Paradoxical Pursuit of Natural Philosophy.Nicholas Maxwell - 2016 - In J. Shearmur & G. Stokes (eds.), Cambridge Companion to Popper. Cambridge University Press. pp. 170-207.
Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos and Aim-Oriented Empiricism.Nicholas Maxwell - 2005 - Philosophia 32 (1-4):181-239.
Back to Darwin and Popper: Criticism, Migration of Piecemeal Conceptual Schemes, and the Growth of Knowledge.Renan Springer De Freitas - 1997 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 27 (2):157-179.
The Usefulness of Fallibilism in Post-Positivist Philosophy: A Popperian Critique of Critical Realism.Justin Cruickshank - 2007 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 37 (3):263-288.
Will the Popperian Feyerabend Please Step Forward: Pluralistic, Popperian Themes in the Philosophy of Paul Feyerabend.Robert P. Farrell - 2000 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (3):257 – 266.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads23 ( #219,876 of 2,172,903 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #324,901 of 2,172,903 )
How can I increase my downloads?