Philosophy 76 (2):271-282 (2001)
This paper argues that a recurrent mistake is made about Scottish moral philosophy in the 18th century with respect to its account of the relation between morality and feeling. This mistake arises because Hume is taken to be the main, as opposed to the best known, exponent of a version of moral sense theory. In fact, far from occupying common ground, the other main philosophers of the period—Hutcheson, Reid, Beattie—understood themselves to be engaged in refuting Hume. Despite striking surface similarities, closer examination reveals a deep difference between Hume's and Reid's conception of ‘the science mind’ which marked the philosophy of the period. Properly understood, this difference shows that mainstream Scottish moral philosophy, far from subscribing to Hume's dictum about morality being ‘more properly felt than judged of’, held that morality is ‘more properly judged than felt of’
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment.M. A. Stewart (ed.) - 1990 - Oxford University Press.
From Cambridge Platonism to Scottish Sentimentalism.Michael B. Gill - 2010 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 8 (1):13-31.
Character, Self and Sociability in the Scottish Enlightenment.Thomas Ahnert & Susan Manning (eds.) - 2011 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
A Very Brief Summary of Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication.Rachel Cohon - 2008 - Hume Studies 34 (2):253-256.
Feeling and Fabrication: Rachel Cohon's Hume's Morality.Don Garrett - 2008 - Hume Studies 34 (2):257-266.
The Scottish Enlightenment, Unintended Consequences and the Science of Man.Craig Smith - 2009 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 7 (1):9-28.
Mind and Morality: An Examination of Hume's Moral Psychology.John Bricke - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads24 ( #208,445 of 2,158,259 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #355,837 of 2,158,259 )
How can I increase my downloads?