Manipulating Games by Sharing Information

Studia Logica 102 (2):267-295 (2014)

Abstract
We address the issue of manipulating games through communication. In the specific setting we consider (a variation of Boolean games), we assume there is some set of environment variables, the values of which are not directly accessible to players; the players have their own beliefs about these variables, and make decisions about what actions to perform based on these beliefs. The communication we consider takes the form of (truthful) announcements about the values of some environment variables; the effect of an announcement is the modification of the beliefs of the players who hear the announcement so that they accurately reflect the values of the announced variables. By choosing announcements appropriately, it is possible to perturb the game away from certain outcomes and towards others. We specifically focus on the issue of stabilisation: making announcements that transform a game from having no stable states to one that has stable configurations
Keywords Boolean games  Nash equilibrium  Communication  Announcement
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DOI 10.1007/s11225-014-9544-5
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Dynamic Logic.Lenore D. Zuck & David Harel - 1989 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 54 (4):1480.

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