Metaphysical libertarianism and the epistemology of testimony

American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (1):37-50 (2004)
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Reductionism about testimony holds that testimonial warrant or entitlement is just a species of inductive warrant. Anti-Reductionism holds that it is different from inductive but analogous to perceptual or memorial warrant. Perception receives much of its positive epistemic status from being reliably truthconducive in normal conditions. One reason to reject the epistemic analogy is that testimony involves agency – it goes through the will of the speaker – but perception does not. A speaker might always choose to lie or otherwise deliberately mislead. It is argued that the force of this derives (in part) from Libertarianism about agency, and that Libertarianism, if it undermines the Anti-Reductionist explanation of why we are entitled to rely upon testimony, undermines the Reductionist explanation as..



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Peter Graham
University of California, Riverside

References found in this work

Against Gullibility.Elizabeth Fricker - 1994 - In A. Chakrabarti & B. K. Matilal (eds.), Knowing from Words. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Transferring knowledge.Peter J. Graham - 2000 - Noûs 34 (1):131–152.
Against Middle Knowledge.Peter van Inwagen - 1997 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 21:225-236.
Testimony, simulation, and the limits of inductivism.Patrick Rysiew - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):269 – 274.

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