Abstract

In this dissertation I defend the use of actual dialogue in moral theory and in the practical moral thinking of people in daily life. I consider and critique three traditional monological models of moral decision-making, one each from Utilitarian, Kantian and Virtue traditions, and I show that without explicit attention to dialogue, the moral thinking these procedures produce is not always accurate or fully productive. I propose, instead, a dialogical model for moral thinking among small groups of people and I call this model "practical moral discourse" or PMD. ;In developing the model, I draw extensively on Habermas's discourse ethics, but I show that while his theory of discourse improves on the monological moral theory of Kant, it does not easily apply to real-life moral deliberation. I offer suggestions for moving from a Habermasian theoretical discourse where participants are idealized super-discussants to a more practical approach in which non-idealized participants actually resolve their real-life moral problems. ;My approach is informed and enriched by the disciplines of socio-linguistics and feminist theory. I draw on empirical research that identifies differences between men's and women's typical patterns of communication and that links women more obviously to the sort of dialogical thinking I propose. I argue also that a small-group dialogical approach to ethics fits with feminist concerns, and that the concept of dialogical thinking ought therefore to be taken seriously by feminist moral theorists. ;I do not claim that all dialogue is good dialogue. In developing the model of PMD, I delineate specific constraints and parameters designed to produce productive dialogue. I also develop and argue for a set of discursive competencies that are required of its participants. In the end, my main aim is to show that a formal approach to small-group dialogical moral thinking will yield better results for moral thinking than monological alternatives because: it uncovers biases in individual thinking; it enables people to identify saliencies and facts that individuals thinking alone might miss; and it facilitates the complex task of knowing other people in their particularity, which is of primary import for high quality moral thinking