Mapping the moral domain

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 101 (2):366-385 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The moral domain is broader than the empathy and justice concerns assessed by existing measures of moral competence, and it is not just a subset of the values assessed by value inventories. To fill the need for reliable and theoretically grounded measurement of the full range of moral concerns, we developed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire on the basis of a theoretical model of 5 universally available sets of moral intuitions: Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity. We present evidence for the internal and external validity of the scale and the model, and in doing so we present new findings about morality: Comparative model fitting of confirmatory factor analyses provides empirical justification for a 5-factor structure of moral concerns; convergent/discriminant validity evidence suggests that moral concerns predict personality features and social group attitudes not previously considered morally relevant; and we establish pragmatic validity of the measure in providing new knowledge and research opportunities concerning demographic and cultural differences in moral intuitions. These analyses provide evidence for the usefulness of Moral Foundations Theory in simultaneously increasing the scope and sharpening the resolution of psychological views of morality

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,219

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations.Jesse Graham, Jonathan Haidt & Brian A. Nosek - 2009 - Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 96 (5):1029-1046.
Moral identity in psychopathy.Andrea L. Glenn, Spassena Koleva, Ravi Iyer, Jesse Graham & Peter H. Ditto - 2010 - Judgment and Decision Making 5 (7):497–505.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-05-26

Downloads
67 (#235,044)

6 months
12 (#183,686)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?