Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):47-68 (2019)

Authors
Richard Gray
Cardiff University
Abstract
Tracking representationalism explains the negative affective character of pain, and its capacity to motivate action, by reference to the representation of the badness for us of bodily damage. I argue that there is a more fitting instantiation of the tracking relation – the badness for us of extremely intense stimuli – and use this to motivate a non-reductive approach to the negative affective character of pain. The view of pain proposed here is supported by consideration of three related topics: the pain caused when the body is damaged, reparative pain, and the messenger-shooting objection to tracking representationalism.
Keywords Pain  Representationalism  Non-Reductive  Intensive Theory
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/papq.12261
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Representational Character of Experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.
What Makes Pains Unpleasant?David Bain - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.
Pains That Don't Hurt.David Bain - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):305-320.
Why Take Painkillers?David Bain - 2019 - Noûs 53 (2):462-490.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Bodily Sensations as an Obstacle for Representationism.Ned Block - 2005 - In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press. pp. 137-142.
An Argument for Nonreductive Representationalism.Richard Gray - 2010 - American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4):365-376.
In a State of Pain.Paul Noordhof - 2005 - In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press.
Character, Content, and the Ontology of Experience.Mark Leon - 1987 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (4):377-399.
Pain Detection and the Privacy of Subjective Experience.Adam J. Kolber - 2007 - American Journal of Law & Medicine 33 (2&3):433-456.
What is a Significant Educational Experience?Geoffrey Hinchliffe - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 45 (3):417-431.
Imperative Content and the Painfulness of Pain.Manolo Martínez - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):67-90.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-11-15

Total views
65 ( #141,268 of 2,325,981 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
31 ( #21,210 of 2,325,981 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes