Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends

Oxford University Press (1986)

Authors
Richard Grandy
Rice University
Abstract
H.P. Grice is known principally for his influential contributions to the philosophy of language, but his work also includes treatises on the philosophy of mind, ethics, and metaphysics--much of which is unpublished to date. This collection of original essays by such philosophers as Nancy Cartwright, Donald Davidson, Gilbert Harman, and P.F. Strawson demonstrates the unified and powerful character of Grice's thoughts on being, mind, meaning, and morals. An introductory essay by the editors provides the first overview of Grice's work.
Keywords Grice, H. P   Belief and doubt   Language and languages
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Reprint years 1988
Buy the book $4.49 used (95% off)   $67.02 new    Amazon page
Call number B1641.G484.P48 1986
ISBN(s) 0198247478   0198244649   9780198244646     0198247478
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Is Davidson a Gricean?John Cook - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (3):557.
Conditional Predictions.Stefan Kaufmann - 2005 - Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (2):181 - 231.
Could There Be a Science of Rationality?Donald Davidson - 1995 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 3 (1):1-16.
Speaker Meaning.Wayne Davis - 1992 - Linguistics and Philosophy 15 (3):223 - 253.

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