Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (3):387-96 (2010)
AbstractThis paper offers several criticisms of the account of rightholding laid out in S. Matthew Liao’s recent paper “The Basis of Human Moral Status.” I argue that Liao’s account both does too much and too little: it grants rightholder status to those who may not deserve it, and it does not provide grounds for offering such status to those who arguably do deserve it. Given these troubling aspects of his approach, I encourage Liao to abandon his “physical basis of moral agency” account of moral status and instead adopt a position closer to a traditional “speciesist” view.
Similar books and articles
Is there a unique moral status of human DNA that prevents patenting?Rogeer Hoedemaekers & Wim Dekkers - 2001 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 11 (4):359-386.
Moral status as a matter of degree?David DeGrazia - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):181-198.
Disputes over moral status: Philosophy and science in the future of bioethics.Lisa Bortolotti - 2007 - Health Care Analysis 15 (2):153-8.
Moral status. Obligations to persons and other living things, by Mary Anne Warren (oxford university press, 1997).Richard Joyce - unknown
On the Moral Equality of Artificial Agents.Christopher Wareham - 2011 - International Journal of Technoethics 2 (1):35-42.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Are Humans More Equal Than Other Animals? An Evolutionary Argument Against Exclusively Human Dignity.Rainer Ebert - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1807-1823.
The Genetic Account of Moral Status: A Defense.S. Matthew Liao - 2012 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (2):265-277.
Being a World Unto One’s Self: A Phenomenal Consciousness Account of Full and Equal Moral Status.Rainer Ebert - 2022 - Zeitschrift Für Ethik Und Moralphilosophie 5:179-202.