Synthese 177 (3):387-409 (2010)

Heidi Grasswick
Middlebury College
Feminist philosophers of science have been prominent amongst social epistemologists who draw attention to communal aspects of knowing. As part of this work, I focus on the need to examine the relations between scientific communities and lay communities, particularly marginalized communities, for understanding the epistemic merit of scientific practices. I draw on Naomi Scheman's argument (2001) that science earns epistemic merit by rationally grounding trust across social locations. Following this view, more turns out to be relevant to epistemic assessment than simply following the standards of "normal science". On such an account, philosophers of science need to attend to the relations between scientific communities and various lay communities, especially marginalized communities, to understand how scientific practices can rationally ground trust and thus earn their status as "good ways of knowing". Trust turns out to involve a wide set of expectations on behalf of lay communities. In this paper I focus on expectations of knowledge sharing, using examples of "knowledge-sharing whistleblowers" to illustrate how failures in knowledge sharing with lay communities can erode epistemic trust in scientific communities, particularly in the case of marginalized communities
Keywords Philosophy   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language   Logic   Epistemology   Philosophy of Science
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-010-9789-0
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References found in this work BETA

The Fate of Knowledge.Helen E. Longino - 2001 - Princeton University Press.
Science, Truth, and Democracy.Philip Kitcher - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
Trust and Antitrust.Annette Baier - 1986 - Ethics 96 (2):231-260.

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

What Is Epistemic Public Trust in Science?Gürol Irzik & Faik Kurtulmus - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (4):1145-1166.
Understanding Epistemic Trust Injustices and Their Harms.Heidi Grasswick - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:69-91.
From Tapestry to Loom: Broadening the Perspective on Values in Science.Heather Douglas - 2018 - Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 10 (8).
Science, Truth and Dictatorship: Wishful Thinking or Wishful Speaking?Stephen John - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 78:64-72.

View all 32 citations / Add more citations

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