Social Knowledge and Social Norms

In Markos Valaris & Stephen Hetherington (eds.), Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy. London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing. pp. 111-138 (2018)
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Abstract

Social knowledge, for the most part, is knowledge through testimony. This essay is an overview of the epistemology of testimony. The essay separates knowledge from justification, characterizes testimony as a source of belief, explains why testimony is a source of knowledge, canvasses arguments for anti-reductionism and for reductionism in the reductionism vs. anti-reductionism debate, addresses counterexamples to knowledge transmission, defends a safe basis account of testimonial knowledge, and turns to social norms as a partial explanation for the reliability of testimony.

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original Graham, Peter J. (2018) "Social knowledge and social norms". In Valaris, Markos, Hetherington, Stephen, Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy, pp. : Bloomsbury Publishing (2018)

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Peter Graham
University of California, Riverside

Citations of this work

The Function of Assertion and Social Norms.Peter Graham - 2018 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press. pp. 727-748.

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References found in this work

Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Testimony: a philosophical study.C. A. J. Coady - 1992 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Content preservation.Tyler Burge - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.
How to defeat opposition to Moore.Ernest Sosa - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:137-49.

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