Journal of Moral Philosophy 18 (2):156-177 (2020)

Authors
Peter Graham
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Abstract
There is a moral phenomenon of “Secondary Permissibility” in which an otherwise morally impermissible option is made morally permissible by the presence of another option. In this paper I explain how this phenomenon works and argue that understanding how it works suggests a new model for the structure of the ethics of harming.
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DOI 10.1163/17455243-1706a001
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