The extension of color sensations: Reid, Stewart, and Fearn

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (S1):50-79 (2011)
Authors
Giovanni B. Grandi
University of British Columbia
Abstract
It seems to be a consequence of Reid’s views on sensations that colour sensations are not extended nor are they arranged in figured patterns. Reid further claimed that ‘there is no sensation appropriated to visible figure.’ As I show, Reid tried to justify these controversial claims by appeal to Cheselden’s report of the experiences of a young man affected by severe cataracts, and by appeal to cases of perception of visible figure without colour. While holding fast to the principle that sensations are not extended, Dugald Stewart (1753-1828) tried to show that ‘a variety of colour sensations is a necessary means for the perception of visible figure.’ According to John Fearn (1768-1837) two motives appear to be central to Reid’s project: his commitment to the Cartesian doctrine of the immateriality of the soul, and his attempt to escape Hume’s dilemma about the existence and materiality of the soul.
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.2014.897475
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References found in this work BETA

Reid on the Perception of Visible Figure.Gideon Yaffe - 2003 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 1 (2):103-115.
The Natural and the Normative.Gordon G. Brittan Jr - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (3):432-434.
Reading Lady Mary Shepherd.Margaret Atherton - 2005 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 13 (2):73-85.
Reid's Account of Localization.Lorne Falkenstein - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):305-328.

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Citations of this work BETA

Replies to Falkenstein, Copenhaver, and Winkler.James Van Cleve - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):232-245.

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