Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):131-151 (2013)

Authors
Richard Gray
Cardiff University
Abstract
Our experiences of heat and cold are usually thought to represent states of things: their hotness and coldness. I propose a novel account according to which their contents are not states of things but processes, more specifically, the opposite processes of thermal energy being transmitted to and from the body, respectively. I call this account the Heat Exchange Model of heat perception. Having set out the evidence in support of the proposal, I conclude by showing how it provides a new perspective on some old problems.
Keywords Heat Perception  Representational Content of Experience  Touch
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Reprint years 2013
DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-0083-5
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References found in this work BETA

The Problem of Perception.A. D. Smith - 2002 - Harvard University Press.
The Problem of Perception.A. D. Smith - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):640-642.
Of Sensory Systems and the "Aboutness" of Mental States.Kathleen Akins - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (7):337-372.
Of Sensory Systems and the "Aboutness" of Mental States.Kathleen Akins - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (7):337--372.

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Citations of this work BETA

On The Content and Character of Pain Experience.Richard Gray - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):47-68.
Senses as Capacities.Casey O'Callaghan - 2020 - Multisensory Research 2020:1-27.

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